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Community, Pluralism and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defence of Why Not 
Socialism?  
Abstract: Is socialism morally preferable to free market capitalism? G. A. Cohen 
(2009) has argued that even when the economic inequalities produced by free markets 
are not the result of injustice, they nevertheless ought to be avoided because they are 
community undermining. As free markets inevitably lead to economic inequalities 
and Socialism does not, Socialism is morally preferable. This argument has been the 
subject of recent criticism. Chad Van Schoelandt (2014) argues that it depends on a 
conception of community that is incompatible with pluralism while Richard Miller 
(2010) argues that it rules out individualistic pursuits. I will show that both of these 
objections rest upon a misreading of Cohen’s argument. 
Keywords: SOCIALISM; G. A. COHEN: CAPITALISM; COMMUNITY; 
EQUALITY 
Introduction 
In Why Not Socialism? G. A. Cohen argues that Socialism is morally preferable to 
Free Market Capitalism.1 He starts by presenting a situation in which he claims 
people would strongly favour socialist principles over the alternatives. On a camping 
trip, Cohen claims, people would favour a situation in which the group’s facilities are 
placed under collective control for the duration of the trip over one based on free 
market principles. Cohen then claims that it is the principles of equality and 
community that are realized on a typical camping trip that make this form of 
                                                 
1 Cohen, G. A. (2009). Why Not Socialism? Princeton University Press. 
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organization so appealing before going on to investigate whether it would be desirable 
and feasible for a society to follow these principles.2 
In the course of his investigation of the principles realized on the camping trip, Cohen 
argues that the principle of community is incompatible with a market system. Cohen 
gives two arguments to support the claim that market societies are community 
undermining. First, they create divisions in society that are incompatible with 
community.3 Second, they undermine the motive of communal reciprocity.4 These 
claims are important because they provide moral reason to favour Socialism that does 
not rest on an appeal to justice.5 
                                                 
2 We might worry that the goals of those on a camping trip are worryingly 
disanalogous to those that members of an economic community possess in their 
everyday lives. For a development of this objection see Ronzoni, M (2011) ‘Life is 
Not A Camping Trip – On The Desirability of Cohenite Socialism’.  Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 1-15. 
3  Ibid, p.37. 
4 See Steiner (2014). ‘Greed and Fear’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (2) 
140-150.  and Van Schoelandt, C. (2014). ‘Markets, Community, and Pluralism’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (254), 149-151 for critiques of Cohen’s argument about 
the undermining of communal reciprocity 
5 Though we might think that if these inequalities are community undermining then 
this can ground objecting to them on the basis of justice. For a development of this 
thought see Gilabert, P. (2012). ‘Cohen on Socialism, Equality and Community.’ 
Socialist Studies, 8(1). 
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This paper will focus on the first of these arguments. Chad Van Schoelandt has 
criticized this argument for presupposing a conception of community that is 
antithetical to pluralism.6 Similarly, Richard Miller, while sympathetic to Cohen’s 
project, claims that this argument rests on a conception of community that is at odds 
with the value of separateness.7 In this paper I will defend Cohen’s argument against 
these objections. I will start by explaining Cohen’s argument and both Van 
Schoelandt’s and Miller’s objections to it. I will then show that these objections rest 
upon a shared misreading of Cohen’s argument. I will finish by responding to some 
objections that might be raised against the correct reading of Cohen’s argument.  
1. Cohen’s Community-based Argument Against Markets 
Cohen’s aim is to show that market generated inequalities are community 
undermining. This Cohen, claims, is the case even under conditions of socialist 
equality of opportunity, where differences in outcome do not reflect natural and social 
capacities but only differences in taste and choice.8 As Cohen points out, a society 
with this form of equality of opportunity might still face three kinds of inequality.  
                                                 
6 Van Schoelandt, C. (2014). ‘Markets, Community, and Pluralism’. Van Schoelandt 
also criticizes Cohen’s argument that markets encourage repugnant motivations, as 
does Jason Brennan (2014) Why Not Capitalism (London: Routledge), 141–148. I will 
not investigate these criticisms here as my goal is only to defend Cohen’s community 
objection to inequality.  
7 R. W. Miller (2010). ‘Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited.’ 
Journal of Ethics 14 (3-4): p.252. 
8 Why Not Socialism?, p.18. 
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First, people may possess differing levels of certain kinds of goods.9 Suppose we are 
presented with a table laden with apples and oranges. Everyone is given the 
opportunity to take six pieces of fruit. Clearly, those who take five apples and one 
orange will have more apples than those who take three of each fruit. Cohen claims 
that this form of inequality is unproblematic, as although there is inequality in the 
distribution of some good there is no inequality in the distribution of benefits.10  
The second form of inequality is that which results from regrettable choices that 
people have made.11 To return to the previous example, suppose that some people eat 
the fruit on the day they get it and the others decide to save it. However, by the time 
the second group get round to eating the fruit, it has spoilt. In this case, the second 
group suffers from an inequality of benefit as a result of the poor choices that they 
have made. Those who did not eat the fruit immediately will no doubt regret the 
choice that they have made. Cohen does not find this form of inequality particularly 
problematic, mainly because on its own it is unlikely to lead to high levels of 
inequality. 
The final form of inequality is that which is produced by differences in option luck.12 
This is the form of inequality that would result from two people who start from a 
                                                 
9 Ibid, p.25. 
10 Ibid, p.19. 
11 Ibid, p.26. 
12 Ibid, p.30. This form of inequality may seem similar to the previous form. The 
difference, though, is that this form of inequality has resulted purely from option luck 
while the previous form of inequality was the result of one group making bad (rather 
than unlucky) choices.  
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similar position but who pick different options in gambling or gambling-like 
behaviour. Suppose, for example, that two such people start off with $100 and decide 
to place a bet of $50 with each other on a coin toss. Once the bet has been settled, one 
of the gamblers will have $150 and the other will have $50. This form of inequality 
arose not through regrettable choices but from reasonable gambling behaviour. As 
Cohen notes, this form of inequality is a necessary part of a market society.13 It is this 
form of inequality that Cohen finds particularly problematic. 
Cohen claims that although the final two forms of inequality are not contrary to 
justice, they ought to be prohibited, or at least severely restricted, because they 
undermine community. 14 To support this claim Cohen gives the example of two 
people, one of whom is rich and the other poor. The poor man has to ride on a 
crowded bus everyday while the rich man drives his comfortable car. 15 One day the 
rich man has to travel by bus because his wife needs to use the car. Cohen claims that 
the rich man cannot reasonably complain to the poor man about having to ride the 
bus, in the way that he could reasonably complain to his fellow car drivers. This is 
because there is a natural community between the fellow car drivers that does not 
exist between the car driver and the bus passenger. 16 This inequality then, is one that 
Cohen takes to undermine community and we will examine why Cohen thinks this in 
the rest of the paper.  
                                                 
13 Ibid, p.33 
14 Ibid, p.34 
15 Ibid, p.36. 
16 Ibid, p.36. 
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What does this have to do with the question of whether or not socialism is preferable 
to free market capitalism?17 The answer is that free market capitalists are committed 
to people being able to choose where to invest their money and their labour and to 
reap the rewards that follow from these investments.18 Given this commitment, those 
who hold this view are committed to allowing these forms of inequality to exist. 
Socialists, on the other hand, are described by Cohen as being committed to 
“collective property and planned mutual giving”.19 Those who hold this view are not 
committed to allowing these forms of inequality to exist. Of course, as Cohen has 
pointed out, someone committed to a socialist form of justice could endorse the 
existence of these forms of inequality. The point, though, is that, unlike the supporter 
of free market capitalism, she is not committed to allowing these forms of inequality. 
She can instead advocate that the collective resources are allocated in other ways. As 
a result, if Cohen is right to say that these forms of inequality are morally problematic 
then this will be a reason to favour socialism over free market capitalism.  
2. Van Schoelandt’s Pluralism Objection 
Van Schoelandt objects that this argument rests on a conception of community that is 
at odds with pluralism. By this Van Schoelandt means that there is something 
valuable about the members of a community having different life experiences and that 
Cohen’s argument presupposes an idea of community that is at odds with this thought. 
If this is right and we accept that any reasonable conception of community will allow 
for diversity then we ought to reject Cohen’s argument. 
                                                 
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking me to clarify the connection here.  
18 Ibid, p.32. 
19 Ibid, p. 10.  
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Van Schoelandt begins his argument by accepting that Cohen’s bus example 
demonstrates how differences in life experience can put communities under strain, at 
least on some senses of the word ‘community’. 20 However, he argues that this is no 
different from the differing life experiences of someone who is strictly kosher and 
someone who loves eating bacon or those of a maths genius and a skilled manual 
labourer. Just as the car driver cannot reasonably complain to the bus passenger about 
having to ride the bus, the bacon eater cannot reasonably complain to the kosher man 
about a day without bacon, nor can the mathematician complain about having to do 
one day of manual labour. The reason in all these cases, Van Schoelandt claims, is the 
lack of shared experience. In all of these situations it is reasonable for people to 
complain to those whose experiences are reasonably similar to their own. It is not 
reasonable, though, to complain to people whose lack of shared experience makes it 
impossible for them to identify with these problems.  
If we accept that in all of these cases what is putting strain on community is the lack 
of shared experience then, according to Van Schoelandt, we ought to accept that if we 
are to prohibit this form of inequality then we ought also to prohibit these forms of 
pluralism. Given that we should not prohibit these forms of pluralism, Van 
Schoelandt concludes that we should not prohibit this form of inequality either.21  
3. Miller’s Value of Separateness Objection 
Miller offers a different objection to Cohen’s argument. Miller also takes Cohen’s 
argument to be about shared experience. He takes Cohen’s point to be that community 
                                                 
20 ‘Markets, Community, and Pluralism’ p.147. 
21 Ibid, p.148-9. 
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requires, “the enjoyed sharing of a common life, including the opportunities it affords 
for empathy based on shared experiences.”22 Despite being sympathetic to this 
concern, Miller claims that it should not be seen as a decisive reason for change. He 
explains his reasons in the following: 
Just as there is something to be said for keeping one’s fishing tackle largely to 
oneself, there is something to be said for paying special attention to one’s 
projects and one’s intimates, for having control over associations that evoke 
attention and empathy, for cultivating large zones of privacy in which one is 
unobserved by strangers and unobservant of them, and for individualistic 
initiatives that do not require cooperation or adherence to public schedules, 
including initiatives that take adventurous risks and seek to prove distinctive 
capacities.23 
In other words, while shared experiences are valuable and help to foster community, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that private experiences, individualistic pursuits 
and prioritizing special relationships can also be valuable. There is a need, Miller 
claims, “to balance values of community with values of separateness.”24 If we accept 
this then the fact that some mode of community organization does not foster 
community does not give us decisive reason to reject it. After all, it may be that this 
form community offers opportunities for other valuable ways of life.  
 
                                                 
22 ‘Relationships of Equality’ p.250. 
23 Ibid, p. 252 
24 Ibid, p. 252 
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4. Why These Objections Miss the Target 
Both of these objections rest upon the claim that it is the lack of shared life 
experiences in the bus passenger example that Cohen takes to be community 
undermining.  
However, given Cohen’s frequent emphasis elsewhere in his book of the importance 
of people being given the freedom to make different choices and live according to 
their own preferences, it would be strange if this were what Cohen took to be 
problematic about the bus passenger example. For example, in his initial description 
of the aims of the camping trip Cohen says that, “our common aim is that each of us 
should have a good time, doing, so far as possible, the things that he or she likes best 
(some of the things we do together; others we do separately).”25 Similarly, when 
Cohen describes the division of labour on such a trip he says, “Somebody fishes, 
somebody else prepares the food, and another person cooks it. People who hate 
cooking but enjoy washing up may do all the washing up.”26 Finally, in response to 
the thought that protecting people’s rights to make personal choices may conflict with 
the values of the camping trip, Cohen says the following: 
There is a right to personal choice on the camping trip, and there are plenty of 
private choices on it, in leisure, and in labor, […] under the voluntarily 
                                                 
25 Why Not Socialism? p.3 Emphasis added.  
26 Ibid p.4. Emphasis added.  
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accepted constraint that those choices must blend fairly with the personal 
choices of others.”27  
In addition to these comments in Why Not Socialism?, remarks Cohen makes in 
earlier work also give us reason to doubt that this is the point he is making. In If 
You’re An Egalitarian How Come You’re So Rich?, Cohen claims that while division 
between rich and poor may be problematic, division between those with different 
interests (beer drinkers and wine drinkers) is not problematic.28 This point is made 
most explicitly in the following: 
In a society with a state-imposed egalitarian income distribution, there is 
plenty for everyone to decide without regard to social duty about the shape of 
                                                 
27 Ibid, pp.47-48. We might worry that all of these examples cannot really be viewed 
as demonstrating differing life experiences as they all take place against a background 
of a shared experience – the camping trip. However, it is worth noting that how much 
shared experiences people have is a matter of degree. Any two humans living at the 
same time will have shared experiences in some sense, even if it is just the shared 
experience of living on the same planet. In the case where people are doing different 
activities on a camping trip there will be to some degree a lesser amount of shared 
experiences. If Cohen’s point was that not having shared experiences undermines 
community then we should expect Cohen to find this lack of shared experience 
problematic to some extent. Cohen, though, does not find this problematic, in fact he 
views it as positive. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
28 Cohen, G. A. (2001). If You Are An Egalitarian How Come You’re So Rich? 
Harvard University Press. p.159. Note that in this book Cohen identifies injustice as 
what is problematic in this division. 
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their own lives […] Inspired by different conceptions of the good, they can eat 
fish or fowl, go to synagogue or church, play football or chess, and so on.29  
Given this repeated insistence that people should be able to make private choices and 
engage in separate pursuits it would be surprising if Cohen’s community-based 
objection to inequality were based on an objection to people being left without a 
shared body of experiences. This, though, is not the point that Cohen is making. 
Cohen’s point is not that community requires a body of shared experience but that 
community requires that people care about one another.30 Cohen makes this clear at 
the start of his argument where he claims: “the requirement of community that is 
central here is that people care about, and where necessary and possible, care for one 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p.167. 
30 On this interpretation, mutual concern is a necessary condition for community. It is 
worth noting that we might also interpret Cohen as viewing mutual caring as both 
necessary and sufficient for community. In support of this interpretation it might be 
pointed out that Cohen seems to define community in terms of mutual caring in the 
following: “general social friendship, that is, community” (Why Not Socialism, p.51). 
However, in defence of the necessary condition interpretation it could be claimed that 
mutual caring may be different from general social friendship. It is, after all, possible 
to care about someone without being her friend. Either way, though, without mutual 
caring there can be no community for Cohen. Given that it appears to be unclear 
which interpretation we should accept I will opt for the weaker claim, that mutual 
caring is necessary for community, as this is all I need to make my argument.  Thanks 
to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
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another, and, too, care that they care about one another.”31 Given that this is what 
Cohen says is needed for community, what is it about the bus example that Cohen 
takes to illustrate a community-undermining form of inequality? The answer is not a 
lack of shared experience but a lack of communal caring. Cohen makes this point 
explicit in the following: 
We cannot enjoy full community, you and I, if you make, and keep, say, ten 
times as much money as I do, because my life will then labor under challenges 
that you will never face, challenges that you could help me to cope with, but 
do not, because you keep your money.32` 
The key point here is that by allowing me to suffer challenges that he could easily 
alleviate, the rich man demonstrates a lack of communal caring. He could help me 
avoid these challenges that he himself will never face but he chooses not to do so and 
this shows that he does not really care about me.  
We can see that this is the point Cohen is making by returning to the bus example. In 
diagnosing what is community-undermining in this case, Cohen does not mention a 
lack of common experience. Instead Cohen says the following: 
There is a lack of community between us of just the sort that naturally obtains 
between the fellow car-driver and me. And it will show itself in many other 
                                                 
31 Why Not Socialism, p.35 
32 Ibid, p.35. Emphasis Added. 
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ways, for we enjoy widely different powers to care for ourselves, to protect 
and care for our offspring, to avoid danger, and so on.33 
The fact that the car driver and the bus passenger enjoy significantly different levels 
of power to alter their circumstances undermines any community that might have 
existed between them. The man who drives an expensive car everyday has the power 
to lessen the challenges that the bus passenger must face. Instead of buying a car he 
could invest the money in improvements to public transportation. By choosing not to 
do so, he demonstrates that he does not really care about the bus passenger or, at least, 
that he does not care in the way that Cohen claims is necessary for community. With 
other car drivers, however, the situation is different. The car driver is no better placed 
than any of the other drivers to lessen the challenges they face. The other drivers do 
not have to labor under challenges he will never face (at least not under the specific 
challenge of having to ride the bus rather than drive a car). The car driver faces 
similar challenges to other car drivers and has similar powers to face them. As a 
result, he has not demonstrated a lack of communal caring for these people and so 
their community relations are not undermined. 
Cohen makes this point once more by returning to the analogy of the camping trip. 
Suppose that one member of the trip has access to a special pond that is full of fish. If 
he chooses not to share his fish with the rest of the group as they eat meagrely then he 
isolates himself from them. Again, the reason for this is that he has the power to help 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p.36. Emphasis Added. 
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them face their challenges but chooses not to, thereby demonstrating a lack of 
communal caring and failing to meet Cohen’s requirement for community.34  
This allows us to see why both Van Schoelandt’s and Miller’s objections miss the 
target. Van Schoelandt’s claim was that if we reject inequality when it leads to 
differing life experiences then we should reject pluralism for the same reason. 
However, as we have seen, this is not what Cohen finds problematic about these 
inequalities and so Cohen is not committed to finding pluralism problematic. To see 
why this is the case, consider again Van Schoelandt’s analogy. Van Schoelandt claims 
that the lack of community between the car driver and the bus passenger is analogous 
to the lack of community between a kosher man and a bacon-lover. However, the 
problems that Cohen raised with the bus example do not occur in this analogy. The 
bacon-eater does not enjoy powers to alleviate any challenges the kosher man faces 
that he does not. He does not, then, demonstrate a lack of communal feeling towards 
him in the way that the car driver does towards the bus passenger.  
Miller’s concern is also misguided. Miller’s objection that Cohen’s view of 
community is one that clashes with the value of separateness is based upon his 
assumption that it is a lack of shared experience that Cohen takes to be community 
                                                 
34 Ibid, pp.37-38. It should be noted that Cohen is less clear in his articulation of what 
is problematic in this example than in the previous two. Cohen simply states that this 
man is “cut-off from communal life” without explicitly stating that the reason why 
this is so is because he has demonstrated a lack of communal caring. Nevertheless, 
given that Cohen has just talked us through two examples and that he states that it is 
condemned by “the ideal of community” which he sets out in the requirement of 
community, it is clear that this is what he takes to be problematic in this case.  
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undermining. As we have seen, though, this is not what Cohen takes to be community 
undermining. Rather it is the lack of communal caring that this inequality 
demonstrates. This objection to inequality is immune to Miller’s objection, as a 
concern for communal caring is not in tension with valuing individualistic pursuits.  
5. Objections and Replies 
In the previous section I argued that both Van Schoelandt’s and Miller’s criticisms of 
Cohen’s view rest upon a misreading. Cohen’s community requirement does not 
require that people lead similar lives. Rather, it requires that people care for and about 
one another. This claim raises an important question. If Cohen’s requirement is 
understood in this way then what reason is there to think that community will be 
undermined by inequality?35 This question becomes particularly pressing when we 
consider that if we understand Cohen’s requirement in the way that Van Schoelandt 
and Miller do then there appears to be a simple answer to this question: inequality 
would be problematic as it would lead to people leading very different lives and so 
failing to share similar life experiences.  
In order to answer this question we should look again at what Cohen takes to be 
problematic in the bus passenger case he discusses. Cohen claims that what is 
problematic in this case is that, “my [the bus passenger’s] life will labour under 
challenges that you [the car driver] will never face, challenges that you could help me 
to cope with, but do not, because you keep your money.”36 This is problematic as “we 
enjoy widely different powers to care for ourselves, to protect and care for our 
                                                 
35 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to consider this issue.  
36 Ibid p.35. 
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offspring, to avoid danger, and so on.”37 The problem Cohen identifies, then, is not 
simply that the car driver and the bus passenger face different challenges but that the 
car driver possesses vastly greater powers to overcome the challenges he faces than 
the bus passenger does. What, though, is the connection between this possession of 
power and Cohen’s community requirement that requires that people care for one 
another?  
The answer is that by using his powers to improve his own life rather than the 
common good the car driver shows that he does not care for other people. As it stands 
this does not look like a convincing response. After all, caring for people is surely 
compatible with using your resources to respond to the challenges that you face rather 
than those facing other people. This response becomes more plausible, though, when 
we remember that the challenges facing the rich man are less important than those 
facing the poor man. By choosing to spend his resources on his own less important 
concerns rather than the major challenges that other people must face, the rich man 
shows that he does not really care for those less fortunate than himself, or at least that 
he does not care a great deal. If he really cared about the bus passengers then he 
would spend his money on their more pressing concerns rather than his more trivial 
concerns. This explains why Cohen thinks that community will naturally arise 
between fellow car drivers but not between the bus passenger and the car driver. The 
reason is that the car drivers do not possess wildly different powers to care for 
themselves and so the fact that one car driver is not using his resources to help the 
others is no reason to think that he does not care about the other drivers.   
                                                 
37 Ibid p.36.  
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However, it might be objected that this explanation fails to explain why inequality 
creates problems for community. After all, if we accept that the problem of inequality 
is that it displays a lack of mutual concern and that mutual concern is necessary for 
community then the lack of caring is not caused by the inequality. Rather the 
inequality exists as a result of the lack of caring. 38  It is the lack of caring after all that 
leads people to use their resources to meet their own trivial concerns rather than using 
them to help alleviate the more serious problems facing other people. If this is the 
case then Cohen would be wrong to say that, “inequality should be forbidden for the 
sake of community,”39 as inequality is only a symptom of a lack of community not a 
cause of it.  
This is an important objection. If we accept this point then it seems Cohen’s argument 
should be rejected, at least if we accept my interpretation of Cohen’s community 
requirement. Fortunately, however, there is a response that can be made to this 
problem. We can accept that, on this account, inequality is caused by a lack of 
community but maintain that it also contributes to a decrease in community as well. 
The reason for this is that it seems plausible to think that once we are aware that 
someone does not care about us it becomes more difficult to care about them. This is 
not only intuitively plausible but is supported by evidence from empirical psychology 
that suggests that when an agent perceives that someone is acting in a caring way 
towards them it makes the agent more likely to respond in a caring way. Similarly, 
when an agent perceives that someone does not care about them the agent is more 
                                                 
38 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.  
39 Ibid, p.37. 
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likely to respond in an uncaring way.40 If we accept this then inequality is damaging 
to community because it makes people aware of the fact that others do not care about 
them. By increasing the awareness of the lack of caring in society, inequality serves to 
exacerbate it and, as a result, to undermine community. 41 The point then is that while 
a lack of caring is problematic in itself, the problem is made worse when this lack of 
caring is made evident because it will foster a further lack of care. Inequality is 
damaging then as it will decrease the extent to which people care about each other.  
A related objection that might be raised against this position is that, as yet, we do not 
seem to have been given any reason to think that a socialist society where there is no 
inequality would necessarily be one in which people care more for one another than a 
capitalist society. It is perfectly possible for people not to care about one another in a 
                                                 
40 See, for example Canevello, A., & Crocker, J. (2010). ‘Creating good relationships: 
responsiveness, relationship quality, and interpersonal goals’. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 99(1), 78. Canevllo and Crocker claim that, “When actors 
perceive their partners as responsive, they are more responsive in return; when they 
perceive their partners as unresponsive, actors are less responsive in return.” Ibid 
pp.80-81. One reason for this, they claim, is that, “People may reciprocate 
responsiveness out of caring. Actors' responsiveness strengthens partners' social 
bonds to actors, including feelings of caring, connection, and trust,” Ibid, p.81, where 
being responsive is defined as understanding, valuing and supporting important 
aspects of the self Ibid, p.78.  
41 We might also worry that when there is a lack of caring there cannot be any 
community to undermine, as in order for there to be community people need to care 
for one another. If we accept this then a display of a lack of caring cannot undermine 
community, as community is nonexistent in this case. However, this point ignores two 
points. First, caring comes in degrees so if someone shows that they do not care much 
about someone else there is still some community to be undermined. Second, even 
when there is no community to undermine there may be an important precondition to 
community that could be undermined, making it harder for community to occur in the 
future. After all, caring may be one-way. The fact that person A does not care about 
person B does not mean that person B does not care about person A, though, as I 
argue below, it does make it more difficult. This one-way caring can not be 
community on Cohen’s view, as community requires mutual caring. Nevertheless, it 
may be an important pre-condition for community and, as a result, undermining it 
may make community harder to achieve. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising 
this objection. 
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socialist system where there is no inequality of outcomes. After all, the equality of 
outcomes in this situation is a result of the social-economic system that is in place 
rather than the caring attitudes that the members of the community have towards each 
other.  
However, there is a response that can be made to this point. The difference between 
the uncaring person in an equal society compared to an unequal society is that in the 
latter the lack of caring is more evident. In a situation where one person possesses 
significant powers to help other people but chooses not to do so then it is evident to 
everyone that that person does not really care about the others. It will, for example, be 
made evident every morning when the rich man drives by the bus in his expensive 
car. While people may not care about each other in an equal society there will be less 
opportunities for this lack of caring to display itself. In a society where resources are 
shared equally there will be fewer opportunities for people to show that they do not 
care about others by using their resources to secure luxuries for themselves rather than 
helping others to face the pressing challenges that they face. If we accept that the 
display of this lack of caring is problematic because it increases the lack of caring in 
society then the opportunity to show a lack of caring in a free market society will be 
detrimental for community. 
However, it might be objected that while a capitalist society presents opportunities for 
people to show that they do not care about each other, it also presents opportunities 
for people to show that they do care about one another. To return to the bus passenger 
example, we could imagine that the rich man donates a significant portion of his 
disposable income to the public transport system.42 Rather than spending his money 
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on an expensive sports car, he buys the cheapest car and donates the difference to the 
public transport networks. Perhaps he also actively campaigns for higher taxation of 
the rich to improve the public transport system. In this example the rich man shows 
that he cares about the challenges facing the poor man. Moreover, this is a case of 
voluntary giving. The rich man does not have to donate this money. He chooses to 
because he genuinely cares about the challenges facing the poor man. This display of 
caring would not be made evident in a system where everyone possessed equal 
resources. This seems to show that inequality is not only compatible with people 
caring for one another but also that it presents opportunities for people to make this 
caring apparent that would not exist in a society with equality of outcomes.  
It could be claimed that, while it is true in this modified example that the rich man 
shows that he cares to some extent about the challenges facing the poor man, the 
remaining inequality shows the limitations of this caring attitude. While the rich man 
cares enough to forego the expensive sports car he does not forego any car 
whatsoever. As a result, there remain important challenges that the poor man faces 
that he could help him with if he were not choosing to instead spend his money on 
less important things for himself. As a result, community between the rich and the 
poor man will still be undermined, albeit to a far lesser extent than in the original 
example.  
Even if we reject the claim that community would be undermined in this case, this 
response still fails to solve the problem. The reason for this is that it will remain the 
case in a capitalist society that those who do not possess this caring attitude to other 
people will be shown not to care about the plight of those worse off than themselves. 
If we assume, as it seems reasonable to do, that not all of the rich will be as altruistic 
as the man willing to make do with a less desirable car then it will remain the case 
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that in a capitalist society there will be situations where this lack of caring is made 
apparent.  
It is also worth pointing out that it is possible for people living in an egalitarian 
society to show that they care about one another. Rather than transferring resources to 
each other, those in an egalitarian society can show that they care for each other by 
being supportive of their egalitarian institutions.43 This then shows that while a 
capitalist society presents opportunities for people to show that they do care for one 
another that might not exist in a socialist society; a socialist society creates 
opportunities for people to show that they care about each other that might not exist in 
a capitalist society.  
However, it would also be possible for people in socialist societies to express disdain 
for the egalitarian policies and for those in free market societies to express support for 
egalitarian policies. If this is right then there do not appear to be significant 
differences between the opportunities for people to show that they care or do not care 
about one another in these different forms of society. 
There are, though, several responses to make to this objection. First, it looks as if 
there are important differences between showing support for a socialist system of 
government in a socialist society and doing so in a free market society. It is, after all, 
entirely consistent to express this support in a socialist society and be quite happy 
with the status quo. However, to do so in a capitalist society seems to require, at pains 
of inconsistency, a commitment to reducing inequality if possible. In addition, while 
the better off in a free market society can show that they care about the plight of the 
worse off by giving them resources this also involves reducing the inequality that 
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exists in society. In effect, then, these ways of demonstrating care for others in a free 
market society are aimed towards making society more like a socialist one.   
Second, if society as a whole decides to structure itself in such a way that the worse 
off are dependent on the good will of the better off to put them in a position to face 
their challenges then this itself seem problematic. After all, it could reasonably be 
claimed that society as a whole is demonstrating a lack of care for the worse off by 
leaving them at the mercy of the better off.  
The most important response to this objection, though, is the pervasive nature of the 
display of the lack of caring in a free market society. While it is possible to display 
care in a free market society and lack of care in a socialist one, Cohen’s point seems 
to be that a lack of care will be constantly made evident in a free market society. We 
can see why by looking at the car driver case. All the car driver has to do is drive to 
work in his car to demonstrate that he does not truly care about the bus passengers, at 
least not to the extent that he would make comparatively trivial sacrifices to 
significantly improve the lives of those riding the bus. So while it is possible to go out 
of one’s way to display a caring or non-caring attitude to one’s fellow citizens in both 
free market and socialist societies, in free market societies well off members of 
society who do not care for their fellow citizens will be inadvertently displaying this 
lack of care almost all the time.  
Another objection that might be raised against my interpretation of Cohen’s account 
of community is that minimizing the opportunity to display a lack of care for others is 
not necessarily something that leads to a flourishing community.44 Suppose, for 
example, there was a totalitarian society that forced people at pain of death to act in a 
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caring way towards one another. This society would minimize the opportunity for 
people to show that they do not care for each other but would not realize a worthwhile 
form of community. This is an important objection to raise against Cohen’s argument. 
Given that it is the extent to which market societies make evident a lack of care that 
Cohen takes to be problematic it seems that he could not object to the totalitarian 
society on these grounds. 
 However, in response it can be pointed out that there is no need to think that it is the 
considerations that make socialist societies preferable to market societies that also 
make them preferable to totalitarian societies. We might plausibly think that the 
reason why socialist societies are preferable to a totalitarian societies are different to 
those that make socialist societies preferable to market societies. The response to the 
previous objection can help us to see one way in which socialist societies are 
preferable to totalitarian. The difference between the totalitarian society that enforces 
people to act as if they care for each other and a socialist society in which people are 
not coerced to act in caring ways is that in the latter but not the former people will be 
able to show that they actually do care for one another. In the totalitarian regime it 
will be difficult for people to work out whether people genuinely care for them or are 
just acting as if they do for fear of the dreadful consequences of not doing so. In a 
non-coercive socialist society however, people will be able to show that they care for 
one another by showing their endorsement for the egalitarian society they live in. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that the fear and mistrust that would likely be 
present in such a totalitarian society will be damaging for community in other ways 
that a non-coercive socialist society would not. Note that this is a different advantage 
to that claimed to make socialist societies preferable to capitalist ones. While both 
capitalist and socialist societies allow space for people to show that they care about 
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each other, the capitalist society makes a lack of caring far more evident than in the 
socialist society. The form of totalitarianism we are considering shares with socialism 
the advantage of making a lack of caring hard to detect. However, the socialist society 
is preferable because it possible to make evident a presence of caring. I take it that 
there are of course many other ways in which the socialist society is preferable to the 
totalitarian one. What I hope to have showed, though, is that even if we look only to 
the extent to which caring attitudes are made evident the socialist society can be 
shown to be preferable.  
A final worry that might be raised against Cohen’s Community Requirement is that it 
might be thought to demand that people care about equality.45 If what is required from 
people is that they care about each other to the extent that they would not use 
resources for their own use when they could be of greater help to other people then 
this might be thought to demand that people care about equality.  This would be 
problematic. First because it is not clear why caring about equality is a necessary 
condition for people living in community with one another. Second because it makes 
Cohen’s argument appear question begging; if caring about equality is essential for 
community then of course an unequal society will create problems for community but 
few advocates of capitalism will be persuaded by this.  
However, Cohen’s Community Requirement does not depend upon people caring 
about equality but upon people caring for each other. This requirement could be 
violated in situations where equality of resources exists. To see the difference 
between the two consider an example where people possess equality of resources but 
demonstrate a lack of caring attitude to one another. Suppose two people, A and B, 
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have both been poisoned with different poisons and, as a result, are in severe 
discomfort. Both A and B are in possession of an antidote but not to the poison they 
have received. A is in possession of the antidote to B’s poison and B is in possession 
of an antidote to a different poison to that effecting either A or B. Both A and B 
possess equal resources in this example. However, if A were to refuse to give the 
antidote to B but to keep it for himself then this would show that she does not care 
about the challenges B faces. Likewise, there could be cases where the requirement is 
not violated but where people do not care about equality of resources. Imagine if A 
finds a small quantity of an antidote to both his and B’s condition. If either were to 
take the entire portion of the antidote then they would be completely cured. Half the 
dose, on the other hand, would only reduce the symptoms by half. If A gives the 
entire dose to B then he shows that she cares about B. This is compatible, though, 
with A not caring at all about equality, after all she has chosen one of the two options 
that would bring about less equality.  
The first part of the previous response highlights the fact that there will be 
opportunities under a system where people possess equality of resources to display a 
lack of caring attitude for one another. This, though, does not create a problem for 
Cohen’s argument. Rather it shows that the difference between the lack of caring that 
is evident in a society with outcome equality and one with outcome inequality will be 
a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. While opportunities for people 
to show that they do not care about the other members of the community will be 
available in a society with equality of outcomes, Cohen’s point is that they will be 
less common than in a society that lacks this equality.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have investigated Cohen’s argument that economic inequalities are 
community undermining. I have shown Van Schoelandt’s and Miller’s objections that 
this argument rests on a conception of community that is incompatible with pluralism 
or the value of individual pursuits are off target. I have argued that both objections 
rest on a shared misreading of Cohen’s argument. Both Van Schoelandt and Miller 
take Cohen’s point to be that community is undermined when people lack a shared 
body of experiences. This, though, is a mistake. The point Cohen is making is that 
economic inequalities bring about situations in which a lack of communal caring is 
made evident. It is this display of a lack of a caring attitude for the other members of 
his community that undermines the community between the rich and the poor that 
they have the power to help. I finished by defending this argument against objections 
that might be raised against it. 46 
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